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IS POSTMODERN RELIGIOUS 
DIALOGUE POSSIBLE? 
Gary L. Comstock 
Not long ago, interreligious conversations were regulated by the ideals of truth, goodness, 
and beauty. We are suspicious of these noble sounding ideals today. [n a world of liber-
ation theology, feminist criticism, and the hermeneutics of suspicion, can there be any new, 
"postmodern," rules to govern our religious dialogues? Not able to consult any general 
theory, or "metanarrative," in order to provide the answer, I simply tell the story of the 
only postmodern Catholic I have ever known. On the basis of that experience, I argue that 
something like the old rules will have to accompany us into the new age. 
Christians engaged in dialogue with members of other religions are justifiably 
interested in postmodernism. 1 Whereas "modern" Christians from Kant to Kung 
assume Christian claims should be supported by evidence, "postmodern" thinkers 
believe we ought to move far beyond this position, Religious beliefs on the new 
view would not be like scientific beliefs, or even like beliefs at aiL We would be 
wrong to think of them as propositions corresponding (or not corresponding) to 
reality, Rather, we would see religious "beliefs" in more playful ways, perhaps 
as linguistic Rook cards randomly shuffled and unpredictably played. For post-
modernists, religious language is to be assessed more by aesthetic than logical 
criteria, more by the canons of good punning than good syllogisming, 
There is a crazy kind of promise in this strange idea. If postmodernism can 
defuse our dogmatic temperaments and lead to an authentic reinterpretation of 
Christianity such that we would all feel less compelled to construct barriers be-
tween our tradition and theirs, or if it can merely help us to understand better 
what it means to participate in dialogue with others, then postmodernism may 
well be worth much of the current hype. 
Before we agree to walk down the aisle, however, it will pay us to consider the 
idea carefully. Suppose we grant that the notion "postmodern Christianity" is 
neither a contradiction in terms nor a meaningless phrase. Suppose we grant that 
postmodern Christians would actually want to continue to engage in conversation 
with members of other traditions about matters of genuine religious concern. We 
can still ask whether that conversation would be intelligible. The question interests 
me because I am a Christian committed to interreligious conversation but am dis-
satisfied with the approach of modern liberal theology. I would like someone or 
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something to supply me with a new understanding of what I'm doing, and to give 
some guidance-perhaps some new rules-for how to go about it. Postmodernism 
promises to fit this bill. But can it? What would postmodern religious dialogue look 
like? Would there be an acceptable-and an unacceptable-range of behaviors? 
ould there be some things we would be told not to do, and some we would be told 
we ought to do? 
Things used to be so clear. In the old days, Jews could look to the biblical 
prophets for instruction about how to behave in conversation: "Speak the truth 
to one another, render in your gates the judgments that are right and make for 
peace, do not devise evil in your hearts against one another, and love no false 
oath, for all these things I hate, says the Lord" (Zechariah 8: 16-17). If the 
prophetic books weren't good enough for them, Christians could hear the message 
reiterated in Paul's instructions to the Christians at Ephesus: "Put away falsehood, 
let everyone speak the truth with his neighbor . . . Let no evil talk come out of 
your mouth, but only such as is good for edifying, as fits the occasion" (Ephesians 
4: 25,29). Premodern Jews and Christians were instructed to seek the truth and 
avoid falsehoods, to do justice and avoid immorality, to work for wholeness and 
avoid divisiveness. Truth, goodness, beauty. 
The rules were only slightly less clear for modem thinkers. Even as they 
shunned the authority ofthe biblical narratives and turned away from the particular 
traditions that continued to try to live by the texts, modernists discovered their 
own metanarratives which, ironically, offered them much the same rules. Whether 
you think of Kant, John Rawls or Jurgen Habermas, the rules for conversation 
are the same: say things that are accurate, that do not unduly coerce others, and 
that lead ultimately toward consensus. Truth, goodness, beauty. 2 
Postmodernists or not, many Christians today have trouble both with the biblical 
injunctions and with the rules supplied by modern theology. We are uncomfortable 
with the idea, whether it is loosely derived from the Bible or more strictly taken 
from Reason, that the same universal principles undergird every particular conver-
sation. We are immediately skeptical about the claim that from these principals. 
we can derive, ahead of time, three ethical rules about how everyone in every dia-
logical situation ought to behave. Our skepticism is (pardon the expression) well-
founded; we have seen too many guided conversations, too many interreligious 
dialogues decided in advance by the patriarchal or antisemitic or triumphal pre-
suppositions of one of the parties. Consider each of the three rules purportedly 
grounded in God's word, or transcendental Kantianism, or pragmatism. 
Truth. For prepostmodernists there was such a thing as right and wrong interpre-
tations of the biblical text, actual historical facts to which texts did or did not corre-
spond, and true and false propositions about the relationship between the story and 
reality. As a consequence, we thought we were justified in becoming upset with 
someone we suspected of lying, intentionally trying to obscure "the facts," unduly 
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disrupting the conversation, or doing anything that seemed contrary to the spirit of 
truth-telling. Now, thanks to the work of deconstructors, philosophers of history, 
narrativists and critics of ideology, we are much more circumspect. Are there really 
any facts of the matter when it comes to interpreting texts? Even if there are, is it 
not clear that the rhetorical form we adopt in order to relate those facts coerces them 
into a message suited to our own interests? For postmodern Catholics and Jews, 
anyone claiming to be "seeking the truth" needs to be carefully scrutinized. What 
is he really after? What does he really want? Who is he really trying to protect? 
Goodness. We used to think that there were things called objective moral truths. 
In our dialogues we would not just be courteous; we tried to be responsible and fair 
in our interpretations of what the other was saying. We would not abide anyone 
who failed to respect the intentions of another. It was simply not permissible to 
treat anyone in the circle as anything less than an autonomous end-in-himself. But 
now we see that appeals to crosscultural moral norms are often just another way of 
controlling access to the circle. Such appeals are very effective in keeping women 
and Africans out of the conversation. We just tell them they must first master the 
rules generations of white westerners have called "rational." But is there really 
such a thing as "the good" independent of any particular tribal narratives about it? 
Even if there is, is it not clear that those who think they know what it is simply use 
this knowledge to protect their hegemony over the conversation? For postmodern 
Presbyterians, Muslims and Conservative Jews, anyone claiming to be "doing 
good" needs a second look. What is the status of his remark? Why would he want 
to say that? Whose good is furthered by such a claim? 
Beauty. In the old days we believed our efforts at conversation should begin 
with introductions, work slowly into the subtly submerged tensions between us, 
eventually get around to stating our disagreements, and then build toward a 
resolution in which we could agree on some matters, agree to disagree about 
others. In this way we could forge a consensus, even a community. It was an 
aesthetic ideal; an artistic whole of different voices blended together. We wanted 
people to air their differences, but we would not permit disruptions for disruption's 
sake. Radical intrusions would have to serve, somehow, the ends of the group, 
the good of the whole. if we could not see how to orchestrate seemingly random 
sounds into the melody pursued by the rest, then we had no recourse but, 
peaceably and delicately as possible, to silence them. In the era of feminist and 
post-Holocaust theology, we are rightfully skeptical about the notion of peaceful 
silencing. And in the era of Charlie Parker and the Paul Winter consort, we are 
rightfully suspicious of the desire to guard too rigidly against unplanned, "stray" 
sounds. We worry about efforts to plan and build one world, one conversation 
of mankind, one story of humanity. Which tribe came up with this particular 
idea of aesthetic wholeness anyway? Why is it that those who benefit most from 
monopoly capitalism and bureaucratic socialism like the image so much? Why 
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do the powerless and the marginal seem to have so little use for it? 
For postmodemists the answers are easy. The three mles-tmth, goodness, 
and beauty---cannot be tmsted to provide the basement for the house of inter-
religious conversation. The blueprints for that house were not only finished long 
ago by the church's draftsmen, but it was built, occupied, and began needing 
repairs centuries ago. To gain entrance to that conversation you have to play by 
house rules. But the mles have been used too long and too often to keep people 
out. Many devout Christians want a new place to talk. Will postmodemism help 
us design and run it? If it turns out that there is such a thing as an authentically 
religious postmodern Orthodox Jew mnning around, and she finds an authentically 
religious postmodem evangelical Christian who wants to talk about God, where 
will they meet to get in out of the rain? Will they have to take their shoes off? 
Will they have to refrain from smoking? 
Since I do not know the answer to these questions, and since (as a self-respecting 
postmodemist) I refuse to consult any metanarrative to supply the answers, I 
have only one option open. And that is to tell a little, localized, story. 
Postmodemists may bristle at the claim, but what follows is a true story. 
Happily, it may also serve the purpose of edification. I once had a colleague I 
will never forget; I'll call him Doug. Doug was the only tme post modem Catholic 
I have ever met, and he is the only postmodem person with whom I ever carried 
on a mnning religious dialogue. Running dialogue is exactly what it was. Doug 
was fond of talking about any and every old thing whatsoever, and it was rare 
to bring up a subject he was incapable of becoming interested in. (The one 
counterexample that comes to mind is college basketball. He had no use for 
what is now ambitiously called "the philosophy of sport.") Doug was well-liked 
by almost all of his colleagues in the philosophy department, and not only because 
he was so amiable. When someone threw him a curve he was wont to respond 
"Oh! You wanna talk about proper basicality? Yeah, we can talk about that. We 
can talk about that if you want to." And then he would proceed to explain to 
you, in clearer terms than you had heard before, just what the subject was that 
you thought you had introduced. He was a remarkable fellow. 
One day Doug gave the department a paper in which he explained his fondness 
for the late Wittgenstein. His postmodern temperament, it became clear, was 
not simply an intellectual preference; he was constitutionally skeptical about 
language. All of us are engaged in many diverse fom1s of life and the linguistic 
conventions that attend them. What distinguished my friend was that he not only 
espoused a particular metaphilosophical view; he tried to live it out. He had no 
native trust in the ability of language to hook up with the world, and he treated 
his colleagues, his students, and his body in ways consistent with his skepticism. 
This is not to say that he mistreated others, but he did disdain the uninteresting, 
the everyday, anything that lacked vigor. A Superman in outlook and tempera-
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ment, he made few attempts to hide his passion for the new and frenetic. 
Doug used to come into my office from time to time and ask, in his unmistakable 
falsetto voice, "So, have you found any good books lately on sightings of the 
Queen?" The first time he asked, I had no idea what he was talking about, or 
who the Queen was. But I soon found out. It was the holy Mother, the Virgin 
Mary, the feminine image of the deity itself. Doug was obsessed with her; he 
would go on for hours about sixteenth century miracles in which a Portuguese 
cloister of devout nuns observed a woman in white robes baptizing infants and 
curing boils. He knew of eighteenth century apparitions of the blessed Virgin, 
in which her Highness sang to the dying and nursed the newborn. Doug would 
tell stories, an unending series of stories, whose main character was the mother 
of God in her healing, therapeutic, and loving ministrations. 
Given his philosophical views, Doug's Catholicism struck me as odd. I knew 
that he attended mass regularly, but I also knew he followed Wittgenstein more 
rigorously than the Pope or Jesus. So once, as a wintry Iowa afternoon turned 
into evening in my study, I asked him about that. "You seem so fascinated by 
all this stuff about the Queen," I said, "but you don't really believe it, do you?" 
"Believe itT' he replied. "Are you kidding?" 
"But Doug," I pressed him. "Real Catholics don't get interested in this mys-
terious stuff because it's so weird. They get interested in it because they have 
strange experiences with the divine and subsequently need to make some sense 
outofthem. You've got it all backwards. So why does it continue to intrigue you?" 
When Doug didn't particularly like the tum a conversation had taken, he would 
occasionally stop talking altogether and-as he put it-"just blow farts." Suddenly 
remembering this argumentative technique, I regretted having asked this lastques-
tion as soon as I'd uttered it. To my relief, however, he did not put a malodorous 
end to this particular dialogue. He went on, in his own cryptic way. 
"Wittgenstein said you can't talk about God. But he didn't say you couldn't 
whistle it." Only then did he walk out, humming some tune from one of the 
dozens of Italian operas he had committed to memory. 
There is a final picture of Doug I want to leave with you. I once asked him 
how one could derive any sort of ethical constraints from his metaphilosophy. 
This time he just laughed, made some disparaging remark about the tightness 
of the Protestant sphincter muscle, and left in good humor. But, in the paper he 
wrote before he died, he directly addressed the question. Here are his views on 
ethics, religion, and Catholicity: 
If you've read [the preceding paper] you perhaps understand why it is 
precisely the ultra-rational types such as L.W. [Wittgenstein], myself, 
Augustine, Evelyn Waugh, Anthony Kenny, Alexius Von Meinong, 
and Elizabeth Anscombe who are so easily rounded up and taken in by 
the Catholics. Once you see through this obligation nonsense [and see 
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that Kantian claims about our moral duties are just one way of controlling 
people, then] you might become justifiably frightened by the rapidly 
expanding possibilities of what you might do [Doug's emphasis]. And 
don't think, Kantians, that the fear here means that we really do want 
to be good in your sense. Surely, if "decadent" means anything, it 
means "doesn't want to be good in your sense of 'good. '" No, the fear 
just means that we fear we'll get into trouble if we can't persuade 
ourselves to resist acting out certain possibilities. 
None of us ever suspected how seriously Doug meant this paragraph. What 
"rapidly expanding possibilities" would "justifiably frighten" us? For Doug, it 
meant, in part, suicide, which he committed within a month after reading his 
paper. But what about his postmodemist Catholicism? Shouldn't that have given 
him some reason to go on, as Master Ludwig (as Doug called him) said? The 
next paragraph in Doug's paper gives the answer. 
The trick to staying out of trouble is to get a "stay-out-of-trouble weight" 
that is so heavy you can't get it off and so you stay-out-of-trouble. And 
believe me kids; Catholicity is so heavy-unlike the superficially 
rationalized, "moral obligation" systems of ethics, you can see through 
it (Catholicity) and yet still believe it. 
Really? I wanted to ask him. Really? You can see through your religion and 
still believe it? But he went on to qualify his remark: 
Well, "believe it" in the sense that you behave in a way that keeps-you-
out-of-trouble, or "believe it" in the sense that in case you don't behave 
safely, then "believing it" adds a certain spice to whatever trouble you 
do get in. No rationalized ethical propositions can add spice to sin in 
the way that a mystery religion in the old sense can. I think this is what 
Wittgenstein meant in the Tractatus when he said that there are no 
propositions of ethics because propositions can express nothing that is 
higher. The highness is, of course, Her Highness. You know-"She-
who-takes-the-weight-away." All of this is perhaps better expressed in 
images than in words. Your plane for Chartres Cathedral is boarding 
at gate number one . . . . 
Consider the image. Postmodem religion is religion that you "see through," 
that you don't really believe. Why stick with it? Because if you don't, you might 
float off into something really serious, become light, like a leaf, blow away. 
Postmodem religion is a tool you use to weight yourself down. But notice how 
unbelievable the idea is. How could you put a weight on top of yourself that 
would be heavy enough to hold you down yet light enough not to crush you? 
The image is as rhetorically persuasive as the one about pulling yourself up by 
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your own bootstraps. But neither one is, in fact, possible. If religion is your 
only weight, but it is a weight that you can literally see through, how can it 
possibly be heavy enough to keep you down? What happened to my friend seems 
to prove the point. Doug's "stay out of trouble weight"-his postmodern Catholi-
cism---did not prove heavy enough to keep him out of trouble. 
Above all else, my friend prized the continuation of conversation, much in 
the same way as Richard Rorty says he does. But, as Doug's own neuroses 
showed him and us, "continuing the conversation" can hardly serve as a rule to 
motivate, much lest justify or regulate, continued dialogue. Why keep talking 
just to keep talking? 
I admired Doug; unlike some deconstructors and postmodernists, he actually 
tried to live out his beliefs. And, while it would be unjustified to rest any final 
judgments about postmodernism in general on this one case, there do seem to 
be some lessons about the possibility of postmodern religious dialogue in Doug's 
story. One is that if we really want to "keep the conversation going" then we 
will have to try to respect the intentions of our partners. Otherwise our partners 
may not put up with our own idiosyncratic habits. Another is that we will have 
to try to say things we more or less believe to be true. Otherwise our partners 
may not know which of our statements to affirm or challenge. Another is that 
we will have to strive for consensus at appropriate moments. Otherwise our 
partners may not see any purpose in continuing the dialogue at all. 
Our skepticism about the biblical and modern rules of conversation teaches 
us that we must open ourselves to an unprecedented amount of unexpected, 
"irregular" contributions. Disruptions may be necessary to insure that no group 
seizes control.' But, not unironically, my experience with Doug leads me to 
think that something like the old rules are going to accompany us a ways further. 
Without some rough rules-perhaps even metanarratives-like the true, the good 
and the beautiful, I do not see what reason we would have to keep talking. 
There is a weight that must be borne when believers try to speak seriously 
about religion. It is a real burden: one not artificially imposed, but actually 
inherited from the history of relations between our traditions. I can see that 
wordplay and punning might be just what we need to overcome the pointless 
polemics of which Christians and Muslims, for example, have been guilty. But 
my sense is that truth, goodness and consensus are going to reemerge as the 
ideals that give us the rules by which we all want our conversations bound. For, 
lacking any such guidelines, what is there to prevent me from turning my back 
on the burdens, shuffling off to my study, and blowing gas and whistling, as 
afternoon turns into night?4 
Iowa State University 
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NOTES 
1. "Postmodernism" is notoriously difficult to define. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, tf. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984), Jean-Francois Lyotard explains the term by opposing it to modernism. Modernism is the 
belief that science is in conflict with stories, and that science is the sole road to truth. Scientific 
knowledge, moreover, must try to legitimate itself; it does so by reference to various "metanarratives." 
Such metanarratives might come in various versions: in epistemology, in the story that knowledge 
rests on a few unquestionable beliefs (Descartes), in ethics, in the story that morality rests on a few 
rational principles (Kant, Donagan), in science, in the story that true discoveries result from adherence 
to a single objective method. By "modem," Lyotard means "any science that legitimates itself with 
reference to a metadiscourse of this (philosophical) kind making an explicit appeal to some grand 
narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the 
rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth" (p. xxiii). 
Postmodernism doubts the validity of any of these grand legitimizing stories. An "incredulity 
toward metanarratives," it believes there are stories, but they are incommensurable, heterogeneous, 
indeterminate: "dispersed" (p. xxiv). This skeptical attitude can be found in the philosophy of religion 
of American "a/theologians" Mark Taylor, Carl Raschke and Thomas Altizer (see, for example, 
Taylor's Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology, Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1984), in the philosophical 
writings of Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida, in the architectural ideas of Michael Graves and 
Stanley Tigerman, the subversive narratives of Donald Barthelme and John Barth, and the disturbing 
films of David Lynch. 
2. The best example of a modernist ethic might be Karl-Otto Apel's attempt to establish moral 
norms on a "transcendental-pragmatic" basis. According to Apel, one cannot consistently argue 
against the view that there are ethical foundations: "For, as long as he argues-for whatever position-
so long must he presuppose the ethics of the ideal communication-community which is always 
anticipated-more or less counterfactually-by the speech-acts of meaningful arguing." What are 
the rules of Apel's transcendental-pragmatic conversational community? They are the norms of the 
ideal speech-situation: "reciprocal acknowledgement of persons as equal partners and [entailed in 
this,] the norm of equal rights and duties in using argumentative speech-acts for proposing, defending, 
explicating and possibly questioning validity-claims, as e.g., truth-claims and (ethical) rightness-
claims." "The Common Presuppositions of Hermeneutics and Ethics: Types of Rationality beyond 
Science and Technology," in Research in Phenomenology 9 (1979): 51. This, in my language, is 
truth, goodness and wholeness. 
3. As I have seized control of this conversation. If this seizure was not apparent before, it is in 
these concluding paragraphs. I wish that it had not taken a self-confessed "deconstructor" to point 
this out, but Gary Percesepe has effectively held my feet to the fire. What is needed is another voice 
(or two) to contest, unravel, and reweave my interpretation of Doug's story. The other Gary suggests 
some tough questions for this one. Who says that Doug's philosophy worked against him? Couldn't 
it actually have been on his side, fighting against other forces assailing Doug, perhaps from his love 
life, or his diet, or his brain cells? Who knows what really went on in there? How do we know that 
what Doug thought had any connection at all with what he did? And even if this Gary's right that 
Doug's philosophy was tied to his final gesture, by what authority do I come to deliver the message 
that Doug's views were nihilistic? Grant Gary C. that one and Gary P. has another; supposing Doug's 
philosophy was suicidal and nihilistic, what has that to do with the affirmative, playful, punning 
spirits of many postmodernists? 
RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 197 
Self-reflexive and self-questioning discourse (such as I have just employed) may be a rhetorical 
device to anticipate and deflect criticism. Nonetheless, I cannot help but try to defend myself by 
disclaiming responsibility for one of my subtexts. It appears to this reader that the author of the 
article thinks that there is a higher-order discourse, to which Gary C. has access and which can 
legitimize his claims about truth, beauty, and goodness in conversation. To the extent that the author 
thinks this, he should be uneasy. I cannot simply disown it; I wrote the article. But, in my final 
authorial and authoritative gesture, I wish to signal my discomfort. I do not mean to suggest that 
there is an absolute set of fundamental principles for conversation, timeless and universal. T do mean 
to suggest that, in the absence of any such a priori principles, we have to work that much harder 
to find new ways-peaceful, energetic, and courageous ways-to go on, together. 
4. I wish to thank Susan Shapiro, Jim Buchanan, Fran~oise Dagenais, David Roochnik, Keith 
Pheby, Gary Percesepe, and William Alston for helpful criticisms of this paper. I originally read 
the paper in slightly different fonn to the "Rhetoric and Religious Discourse" section of the American 
Academy of Religion in December 1986, the Philosophy Department of St. Olaf College in February 
1987, and the Wheaton College Summer Philosophy Seminar in June, 1987. 
